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  The Economic Research Forum (ERF) produced a one-off survey of 
micro & small private enterprises (MSE) in a number of Middle East 
and North African countries (MENA).  It contains sufficient 
information to fit a production function and additional information 
about the owner’s education type; the scope of the market; and the 
type of technology.  Further, it provides information about perceived 
constraints to production.  We test the effect of these factors on 
technical progress.  We believe that empirical research of policy issues 
can help promote the making of ‘evidence-based policies’ in the MENA 
countries. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The role of the MSE in development is fuzzy. The contribution to 
economic and employment growth, and to poverty reduction is 
questionable because the channels through which MSE affects growth 
are not well understood and empirical support for them is not at all 
robust.  See Hallberg (2001) and Biggs (2002), and USAID report 
(2006) for extensive review of the literature.
1 
Very little is known about MSEs in the Middle East and North Africa 
countries (MENA) let alone empirical research in this area.   
Unavailability of data is probably the main problem facing researchers.  
The ERF published surveys for MSEs.
2 We use these data to analyze 
factors that affect technical progress and eventually output per worker 
in four MENA countries, three Arabic: Egypt, Morocco, Lebanon, and 
Turkey.  Turkey is a non-Arab country and serves as a control. 
The objective is to provide information to policymakers about the 
factors that potentially have positive effects and those which constraint 
output per worker in MSEs.  Also, shedding light on the relative 
performance, e.g., Egypt relative to Turkey, might serve as an 
indicator for productivity level and informs the policymakers.  We 
hope that this paper help promotes research-based policies in the 
MENA countries.   
The ERF data include output, capital expenditures and labour, which 
enable us to fit a production function to each country.  As far as we 
know the literature on MENA countries does not have any estimates of 
production function for MSEs.
3  Further, the data also allow us to 
examine: (1) the effect of the scope of the market on output per 
1Whether privatising publicly-owned firms increase productivity or not is another 
serious policy question. Megginson and Netter (2001) is an excellent survey of this 
literature. There are also a few non-journal article country studies, for example, 
Veselka M (2005), on Taiwan; the UNCTAD report ITE/TEB/5 about Burkina 
Faso, Nepal, Samoa and Zambia; Smallbone et al. (2001) about Ukraine and 
Belarus and Centeno (2001) about Peru. 
2“The country data is collected by a country team supervised by as part of ERF’s 
project on “Promoting Competitiveness in Micro and Small Enterprises in the 
MENA region” Other outputs of the project for each of the four countries include: a 
country report (produced as ERF Research Reports) and a policy brief that will 
soon be available in print and on the website. 
3ERF research report series No 0420 by Semsa Ozar, reports an ad-hoc growth 
equation, not a production function, for Turkey’s MSE. Weshah A. Razzak    61
worker.  We test whether there are different effects on output per 
worker from selling output in a local market versus a regional, national 
or international market.  (2) The survey identifies several different 
levels of training of the owner/manager such as formal type of 
education, technical or vocational training, and an apprenticeship 
experience. The question is whether the level of skills of the 
owner/manager affects output per worker. Finally, (3) Does the level 
of the technology used in production whether traditional, up-to-date, 
or new technology, affect output per worker?  
The survey asks managers and owners of the firm if the followings are 
considered constraints: (1) securing initial capital; (2) licensing and 
registration procedures; (3) Labour law; (4) labour inspection; (5) 
labour costs; (6) meeting environmental requirements; (7) finding 
qualified workers; (8) retaining qualified workers; (9) availability of 
raw materials; (10) unutilised capacity; (11) taxes; (12) custom duties; 
and tax administration procedures.  The answer is either a “yes” or a 
“no” then three levels for each question: easy, medium and high, are 
identified.  We test the insignificance of these constraints on output 
per worker.  Finally, to measure relative performance, we use a series 
of nonparametric techniques to test whether the levels of output per 
worker are equal across countries.   
The data have shortcomings.  We do not examine whether 
privatisation of publicly-owned firms is the right policy because we do 
not have data about state-owned enterprises and don’t have 
information about privatised previously state-owned enterprises. And, 
surveys used in this paper contain information for one year only.   
Thus, dynamic analysis of any sort is not applicable, i.e., we cannot 
examine factors affecting productivity and/ or TFP growth and we are 
restricted to examining the level of output per worker.  Also, the 
surveys do not provide information about the strata; the primary 
sampling units, weights…even though they discuss the methodology. 
For this reason we could not control for sampling design effect.   
We found significant differences between the three Arab countries, 
Egypt, Morocco and Lebanon on one hand, and Turkey on the other.   
On average, Turkey’s MSEs produce twice as much output and spend 
twice as much on capital investments.  The level of Labour employed 
is also significantly higher in Turkey.  The production functions might 
exhibit decreasing returns to scale in all Arabic countries, except for 
Turkey where it exhibits increasing returns.  The level of education of Journal of Economics and Econometrics  Vol. 53, No. 1.                                               62
the owner/manager has no effect on the level of output per worker, 
except perhaps for Turkey.  The effect of technology on production 
varies across countries. We found that the level of education of the 
owner/manager and the technology type is insignificant in the Arab 
countries, but not in Turkey.  The effect of market scope varies across 
countries, but on average, has a  significant positive effect on the level 
of productivity. Finally, we find numerous significant constraints to 
productivity.  The constraints have more or less similar effects on 
production across countries.  
In the next section we describe the data.  In section 3 we discuss the 
methodology.  Section 4 includes analysis and estimation results.   
Section 5 includes final remarks and policy issues. 
2 DATA  
The surveys are described and analyzed in ERF documents such as 
Hamdouch (2006), Hamdan (An ERF undated report number 0417) 
and El — Mahdi (2005) for Morocco, Lebanon and Egypt respectively. 
In general, the samples include a number of regions selected to 
represent metropolitan and rural areas.  The primary sampling units 
were randomly chosen.  Each includes a number of primary sampling 
units from N geographical areas.  Then the samples were classified in a 
number of categories according to densities.  Densities were designated 
according to the mean of firms per building and the primary sampling 
units were divided into three equal groups: the lowest, medium and 
high. A stratified random sample of enterprises was selected from the 
list of enterprises within each primary sampling unit. Then a stratified 
random sample was selected from each density category within the 
primary sampling unit.  Unfortunately, this information is not 
reported.  
The firms include 1 to 50 workers, which is a typical definition of an 
MSE.  The micro firm employs 1-9 and small firm employs 10-50 or 
something close to that.  The enterprises cover various industries such 
as manufacturing, services, trade, and other sectors.  They include 
businesses like bakeries, leather and shoemakers, barbers, etc.  The 
surveys exclude agriculture, any non-market activity, domestic 
services, professionals like lawyers, doctors and accountants, mobile 
vendors and illegal activities.   Weshah A. Razzak    63
The usable number of observations for Egypt in this paper is 3719 
observations.  For Morocco we have 4388 observations in total and for 
Lebanon 644 observations, which is a relatively shorter sample.  These 
samples are smaller that the total number of observations in the 
surveys because:  (1) There are missing observations.  (2) We removed 
double-counted observations probably entered by mistakes.  (3) We 
removed observations with the value of zero.  (4) And when a firm 
leaves some questions unanswered the firm is not included in our 
sample.  (5) We removed firms, which are identified as co-operatives 
ad kept the private firms only.  We deflated output and capital by the 
CPI of the year of the survey for each country.   
The ERF research report series No 0418 (FEM 21-31), p. 6 says that in 
Egypt, MSEs sectors may account for 97 percent of all firms in Egypt; 
81 percent of the informal sector, and employ 2/3 of the workers in the 
country.  The central bureau of statistics reported that 95 percent of 
the firms in 1998 employ less than 50 workers, i.e., MSEs.   
For Turkey we have a sample of 2951 firms.  The survey was 
conducted over 7335 sample units (from 9280 eligible units) between 
June and September 2001, with a pre-test in February 2001 and a 
follow up in 2002. However, only 5000 interviews were completed. The 
sample is national in coverage and is also chosen by stratified, multi-
stage systematic sampling method by the Turkish statistical institute 
(TURKSTAT). Nineteen provinces were firstly chosen, from strata in 
terms of socioeconomic development level, by weighted probability 
regarding the number of enterprises in each province. Secondly, 432 
Primary Sampling Units, with a minimum of 45 enterprises, were 
selected according to the geographical areas (Urban/rural). 
The survey also excludes enterprises in agriculture, non market 
activities, illegal activities, production for own personal use, mobile 
vendors, domestic services, and professional services.  The usable 
number of observations is reduced to 2951 after excluding the number 
of co-operatives (leaving private firms only), deleting missing 
observations and null values for labour, output, and capital; and in the 
dummy variables. Dummy variables which describe custom duties and 
raw material availability were also removed due to missing values. 
Capital expenditures as a net asset value from inventory and cash have 
also some negative observations, which were deleted. 
Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 are plots of log output, log capital expenditures 
and the level of labour for each country.  Clearly there are more micro Journal of Economics and Econometrics  Vol. 53, No. 1.                                               64
enterprises in the samples (up to 10 workers) than small enterprises 
(10-50 workers), but for Turkey there are relatively more of the latter. 
Figure 1: Egypt  Figure 2: Morocco 
Morocco seems different from the other two countries.  It seems like 
the data are ordered from low to high employment without any 
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firms on the horizontal axis, and relatively speaking, there are more 
small size firms than micro firms. 
Figure 3: Lebanon  Figure 4: Turkey 
Log Output 
Log Capital Expenditures 
Labor 
The percentage of firms with one worker is 34.1 percent in Egypt, 24.1 
percent in Morocco, 47.6 percent in Lebanon and 15.8 percent in 
Turkey. Liedholm and Mead (1999) say that productivity seems to 
increase with the number of employed workers; firms with one worker 
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to be only partially consistent with that. Turkey MSEs are most 
productive, but Morocco's MSEs are less productive than Egypt and 
Lebanon despite the fact that the percentage of one-worker firms is 
relatively smaller. 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
 Egypt  Morocco 
 Output Capital  Labour    Output Capital Labour  
Mean  6.6  8.41 0.62  7.75 10.53  0.85 
Median  6.6  8.29 0.69  7.57 10.48  0.69 
Std.  Dev.  1.31 1.66 0.54  1.94 2.07 0.74 
Skewness 0.28  0.26  0.64  0.83 0.00 1.41
Kurtosis 4.2  3.38  3.93    3.38 4.02 6.02  
Jarque-Bera 272.4 67.2  392  540.3 192.01  3130 
Probability  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.0000  0.000 
Observations  3719 3719 3719  4388 4388 4388 
         
 Lebanon    Turkey 
 Output Capital  Labour  Output Capital Labour 
Mean 7.48  9.56  0.56  13.07 15.28 1.09
Median 7.51  9.82  0.69   13.02  15.17  1.09 
Std. Dev.  1.27  1.69  0.67  1.42 2.00 0.76
Skewness 0.16  -0.73  1.40  0.22 0.009 0.67
Kurtosis 4.93  4.71  5.29  3.81 2.89 3.50
Jarque-Bera 103.9 136.3 352  105.5 1.47 257.6
Probability 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.47 0.000
Observations 644  644  644  2951 2951 2951
Notes: All variables are in natural logarithms.  
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics.  The means of output, capital 
expenditures and labour look similar for the three Arab countries and 
smaller than Turkey.  On average, the moments are almost unchanged 
when we removed a couple of larger firms, firms with large output and 
capital.  The Jarque-Bera is significant, except for, Turkish capital 
expenditures.  it indicates non-normality, which we will be dealing 
with when we get to the regression analysis later.   
3 METHODOLOGY  
The Cobb-Douglas is a sensible and simple initial technology to use. 
We Test the Cobb-Douglas production function, which is given by:   
i
ii i i YA K L e
    (1) Weshah A. Razzak    67
Where  i Y  is theithfirm real output,  i A  is technical progress,  i K  is 
capital,  i L  is labour, and  i e
  is the error term, which has classical 
properties.
4  We do not have data for the stock of capital.  Instead, as 
explained earlier, we have capital expenditures. It is not possible to 
calculate the stock of capital with one observation.  To compute the 
stock, the formula is given by  00 /( ) SEE d   , where  0 S  is initial 
stock of capital either at the beginning or the end of the period.  The 
term  0 E  denotes expenditures at constant prices during the first year, 
E   is the average annual growth of expenditures for the nearest 
relevant year, and d  is the depreciation rate.  To compute the stock, 
we have to have data for the initial year stock of capital and 
depreciation rates for thousands of firms, which we don’t. And we have 
no data for the growth rate of expenditures since the data cover one 
year only.  With expenditures instead of the capital stock, the least 
squares coefficient estimate   , will be overstated.  
Dividing through by labour and taking the natural logs we arrive at 
the output per worker level equation, where lowercase denotes the 
natural log per worker,  ln( / ) ii i yY L  ;  ln( / ) ii i kK L  and  ln( ) ii lL  : 
ii i i i ya k l      (2) 
Where  1    measures the deviation from constant returns to 
scale. When  0    the production function exhibits a constant returns 
to scale, when >1 increasing returns to scale, and when <1 decreasing 
returns to scale.   
Recall that there is no time dimension in the production function 
because the data are cross-sectional and cover one year only.  The 
equation is in log levels and does not allow for dynamic analysis. 
Further, technical progress  i a  is assumed to be a function of  1 D  and 
2 D  which are shifters act like the constant term in the regression: 
12 (, ) i ag D D   (3) 
4We do not have data on capacity utilisation (output / capacity) per se. Capacity is 
the greatest level of output that a plant can maintain assuming sufficient 
availability of inputs to operate the machinery and equipment in place. However, 
one of the questions in the surveys is whether unutilised capacity is viewed by the 
manager as a constraint to production. Journal of Economics and Econometrics  Vol. 53, No. 1.                                               68
1 D  is a set of dummy variables.  It includes (1) market scope (local, 
regional, national and international); (2) the manager’s skills level 
(formal training, vocational and an apprenticeship experience; and (3) 
the level of technology (traditional, up-to-date, and new).  (4) Access 
to business support.  Each dummy takes a value of 1 if the answer is 
yes and zero otherwise.  For example, the manager is asked whether 
the scope of the market is local. If the answer is yes the dummy takes 
a value of 1 if not, zero.   
The dummy  2 D  is a set of additional dummy variables that capture 
the constraints to the production process.  These dummy variables are: 
(1) securing initial capital; (2) licensing and registration procedures; 
(3) labour law; (4) labour inspection; (5) labour cots; (6) meeting 
environmental requirements; (7) finding qualified workers; (8) retaining 
qualified workers; (9) availability of raw materials; (10) unutilised 
capacity; (11) strong domestic competition from micro enterprises; (12) 
strong domestic competition from small enterprise; (13) strong 
domestic competition from large enterprise; (13) strong competition 
from imports; (14) financial services; (15) other business support 
services; (16) tax rates; (17) custom duties; and (18) tax 
administration procedures.  Managers are asked if yes or no, and if the 
answer is YES is the effect easy, medium or high.  We design 3 
dummy variables: easy, medium and high.  The dummy will have a 
value of 1 for yes and 0 otherwise.  
With dummy variables, we estimate: 
12 tan ii i i yc o n st k lDD       (4) 
We estimate the regression using Least Squares and the variance-
covariance matrix is heteroscedacticity-corrected using the Huber-
White and the Newey-West methods.
5 The estimated coefficients will 
be interpreted as averages across all firms. We will also report 1000 
repetitions bootstrapped standard errors because of the expected non-
normality of residuals we mentioned earlier. 
For each constraint, the dummy variables (easy, medium and high) are 
not correlated.  But overall, dummy variables maybe correlated, e.g., 
dummy for ‘securing initial capital’ and a dummy for ‘taxes’ maybe 
5We cannot use other estimators such as GMM because of lack of instruments. Lags 
cannot be used either because we a cross sectional data with no time dimension.  Weshah A. Razzak    69
correlated.  When the dummy variables are perfectly correlated,  1 XX    
of the least squares method cannot be computed.  Fitting all the 
dummy variables is not possible.  We use a forward stepwise 
regression. We begin the regression with ln ln kl   and lnl  as regressors 
then we add the set of dummy variables. We begin with  1 D : type of 
technology; type of education of managers; and the scope of the 
market.  We then use F  test to test whether each group is significant, 
i.e., whether for example traditional technology, up-to-date technology 
and new technology dummy variables are zero.  If not, we keep them.  
We also check the t statistics.  We only keep the significant dummy 
variables.  Then we begin by adding three dummy variables at the 
time from the set  2 D . For example, we add tax dummy: easy, medium 
and high.  If  1 XX    is computable we check the F and ttests. If  1 XX    
is not computable, we find and drop the one dummy that causes the 
singularity and check the rest usingF and  ttests.  We carry on by 
adding the next dummy variables from  2 D , e.g., ‘securing initial 
capital’ (easy, medium, and high). If  1 XX    is computable we check the 
F  and t tests. If  1 XX    is not computable, we find and drop the one 
dummy that causes the singularity of XX   keeping all previously 
checked dummy variables unchanged. Normally one dummy variable 
can cause the singularity of XX  . Then we use F  and t tests to check 
the remaining dummy variables.  
Finally, we use nonparametric methods to compare the level of output 
per worker across the firms and across the countries,   ii yl  . We use a 
variety of tests to test the null hypothesis that the distribution of log 
output per worker of each of the three Arab countries is equal to the 
distribution of log output per worker in Turkey.     
We choose three nonparametric tests.  The first test is the Wilcoxon 
(1945) Rank Sum test, which is also known as the Mann-Whitney 
(1947) two-sample statistic.  It is a test for assessing whether two 
samples come from the same distribution. The null hypothesis is that 
the two samples are drawn from a single population, and therefore 
their probability distributions are equal. It requires the two samples to 
be independent, and the observations to be ordinal or continuous 
measurements, i.e. one can at least say, of any two observations, which 
is the greater.  This test is one of the best-known non-parametric 
significance tests. It was proposed initially by Wilcoxon (1945), for 
equal sample sizes, and extended to arbitrary sample sizes and in other Journal of Economics and Econometrics  Vol. 53, No. 1.                                               70
ways by Mann and Whitney (1947). MWW is virtually identical to 
performing an ordinary parametric two-sample t test on the data after 
ranking over the combined samples
.6  
In general, let  1, m XX   be iid with any distribution function  () Fx, and 
1 m YY   are iid with any distribution function  () Gx . The null hypothesis 
is  0 :( ) ( ) , ( ,) HF x G x e a c h x     . However, it is trickier when it comes 
to the alternative hypothesis just like the literature on stochastic 
dominance because the alternative hypothesis could be take different 
forms.  One possible and common form is to assume a shift model like 
() ( ) Gx Fx   , and then the alternative hypothesis is written in terms 
of, as  1 :0 H 	 . Another version is  2 :( ) ( ) , ( ,) HF x G x e a c h x 
     
and with a strict inequality for at least onex .  G is said to be 
stochastically larger thanF .  2 H is a larger class of alternatives because 
1 (, ) FG H   implies  2 (,) FG H  . The other alternative in terms of Mann — 
Whitney statistic is  3 :1 / 2 XY H  	 .  These large alternatives regarding 
the Wilcoxon Rank Sum test are well-documented in the literature, see 
Randles and Wolfe (1979, p. 130-132).  
The second test is the Pearson test, Anderson (1996).  It is a 
nonparametric K-sample test on the equality of median. It tests the 
null hypothesis that K samples were drawn from populations with the 
same median.  In the case of two samples, the test statistic is 
distributed chi-squared and calculated with and without a continuity 
correction.  We report only one statistic; fewer more statistics are 
calculated, but they are not reported because they have the same p 
values.  








   where  1 N RR  are the joint rankings of  11 (, ) mn ZX X Y Y    and 








  where I is the indicator function. When there are no ties, 
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 	  . In the presence of ties, the U statistic is modified by 
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The third test is the Kolmogorov-Smirnov, which is a well known non-
parametric test to test for the equality of distributions.   Rejection of 
the null by this test is probably an indication of the weakness of this 
test in cases where there are differences in the tail of the distributions.  
However, it is very powerful for the alternatives that involve clustering 
in the data.
7  
Wagner (2006) uses the above mentioned tests to test for first-order 
stochastic dominance. We are interested in ranking by rejecting the 
null hypothesis of equality of the distributions.  Note that we do not 
disaggregate by sectors, regions or by micro versus small firms. We do 
not do that to avoid repetition. The results we will report next are 
interpreted as averages across firms. 
4 RESULTS  
4.1 Regression results 
A major concern for estimating the production function using survey 
data is to control of survey design effects. The surveys, as explained 
earlier were done on stratified samples by industry and geographical 
areas.  However, the published data do not report information about 
the strata, primary sampling units etc. so we could not use the 
subcommand ‘svy’ in STATA to run regressions. 
Table 2 reports the least squares regression results of equations 2 and 
4.  The first column lists the explanatory variables.  The second and 
7The Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics is (Kolmogorov (1933) and Smirnov (1939), 
Conover (1999) is not very powerful against differences in the tails of the 
distributions. It is, however, very powerful for alternative hypotheses that involve 
clustering in the data. The statistics to evaluate directional hypotheses are 
  max ( ) ( )
x
DF x G x    and    min ( ) ( )
x
DF x G x   , where  () Fx and  () Gx are the empirical 
distribution functions for the sample that we are comparing. The combined 
statistic is  max(| |,| |) DD D   . The p value for this statistic can be obtained by 
evaluating the asymptotic limiting distribution. Let 1 n be the sample size for the 





12 1 2 , 1
l i m P r / ( 1 2 (1 ) e x p (2 ) i
nn nn i




     . The first five terms form the 
approximation a P used in the calculation (see STATA reference book). The exact p 
value is calculated by a counting algorithm (Gibbons (1971, p. 27-131). A corrected 
p value was obtained by modifying the asymptotic p value using a numerical 
approximation technique  1
12 12 1 2 1 2 ( ) 1.04 / min( , ) 2.09 / max( , ) 1.35 / ( ) a ZP n n n n n n n n       and p 
value =  () Z  , where   is the cumulative normal distribution function. Journal of Economics and Econometrics  Vol. 53, No. 1.                                               72
third columns are for Egypt; the fourth, fifth are for Morocco, sixth 
and seventh columns are for Lebanon and the last two columns are for 
Turkey.   
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For Egypt, the average coefficient of capital expenditures per worker is 
0.35, which seems sensible given our knowledge of the average estimate 
of    in international literature on the Cobb-Douglas production 
function.  The production function exhibits decreasing returns to scale 
since  0    (-0.07). This could mean that the market of Egypt MSEs is Weshah A. Razzak    73
quite small and costly because it needs more than doubling of factor 
inputs to double output; or it could mean that average MSE in Egypt 
consistently prices output below marginal cost. 
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Basu and Fernald (1997) suggest that this interpretation and 
decreasing returns to scale sounds illogical for a profit maximising firm.  Journal of Economics and Econometrics  Vol. 53, No. 1.                                               74
In developing countries, however, and for micro and small firms in 
particular, the assumption of profit maximisation may not hold.   
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  1.06  1.04  1.78  1.62 1.06 1.01 1.06 0.99
 
Notes: i  Number of firms -is 3170; ii Number of firms is 4390; iii Number of firms is 
644; iv Number of firms is 2951.  i y is log output per worker.  All regressors other than 
k (log capital expenditure per worker) and  l (log labour).  1 D is a set of dummy 
variables includes the level of education of the owner or manager; market scope and 
the level of technology used in production.   2 D includes dummy variables that capture 
the constraints to the production process.  These dummy variables are: (1) securing 
initial capital; (2) licensing and registration procedures; (3) labour law; (4) labour 
inspection; (5) labour cots; (6) meeting environmental requirements; (7) finding 
qualified workers; (8) retaining qualified workers; (9) availability of raw materials; (10) 
unutilised capacity; (11) strong domestic competition from micro enterprises; (12) 
strong domestic competition from small enterprise; (13) strong domestic competition 
from large enterprise; (13) strong competition from imports; (14) financial services; 
(15) other business support services; (16) tax rates; (17) custom duties; and (18) tax 
administration procedures. P values are in parentheses. The standard error and the 
covariance are White Heteroskedasticity-adjusted using both Newey-West methods. 
Bootstrap (1000 repetition) standard errors are in square brackets. Constant terms are 
significant and not reported. 
Alkawaz (2006) studies the non-performing firms in a number of 
MENA countries.  For Egypt, he reported existing non profitable firms 
with negative value added.  MSE are financed by loans. Often the 
MSEs cannot even pay their interest payments.  And, government 
subsidy is the only reason that these firms to be alive. Alkawaz 
calculated that a non profitable firm could exist for up to 6 years.   
Thus it is quite probable that our sample include a large number of 
these non-profitable firms. To answer this question rigorously we Weshah A. Razzak    75
require employee-employer-linked data to shed light on after-tax 
profits.
8 
Regarding the dummy set 1 D , we found that the level of education of 
the owner / manager and technology types do not seem to have 
significant positive effects on productivity.  Up-to-date technology type 
is significant at the 10 percent level only.   
Firms selling their products in local and international markets do not 
seem to add anything to productivity.  The dummy variables that 
capture local and international markets are insignificant and hence 
dropped out of the regression. Selling in regional and national markets 
seems to increase the level of output per worker quite significantly. 
The sizes of these coefficients are big, 0.50 and 0.85.  One 
interpretation is that MSEs products are likely to appeal to regional 
and national Egyptian households. 
Producers probably receive feedbacks from buyers to improve these 
products.  Access to business support also seems beneficial.  All three 
levels, easy, medium and high seem to affect productivity in a positive 
way. 
The significant dummy variables that represent constraints, i.e., have 
negative effects are: securing initial capital (access to credit); 
competition from imports; competition from other micro firms; 
environmental requirements; labour inspection; and finding and 
retaining qualified workers. The other constraints (licensing and 
registration procedures; labour law; availability of raw materials; 
unutilised capacity; taxes; custom duties; and tax administration 
procedures) have no significant effect.  We do not report them to save 
space.  The literature considers the inability to secure initial capital or 
credit constraint as a rational for government interventions because 
this is considered to be a case of a market failure.   
Competition from imports has been cited in this literature as a 
problem to MSE. We do not consider ‘competition from other MSE’ as 
a constraint to productivity because competition is an important 
determinant of efficiency.  Weak MSE will exit.  Efficient MSE will 
stay, and might have a future.   
8A negative coefficient on log labour in the regression might be interpreted as ‘labour 
surplus’. It means that adding more labour to existing capital has reached a point 
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Note, however, that the magnitude of the environmental requirement 
dummy is very large.  These requirements must be stiff such that 
MSEs find them costly and compliance seems to adversely affect 
output per worker. Labour inspection also seems to be adversely 
affecting output per worker.  We do not have details on the nature of 
inspection, but child labour is widespread in the MENA countries.
9  
When MSE firms are shutdown because of violations of the child 
labour or the environmental laws, output and productivity plummet.  
We believe that the policymakers should study the reasons for these 
negative effects and fix them if there is an interest in promoting MSEs.  
The coefficient of k , and l  seem very stable across regressions.  Recall 
that we use a forward stepwise regression method; the estimated   and 
 remain stable as we add more dummies to the regressions.  
For Morocco, the average coefficient of capital expenditures per worker 
is relatively small, 0.07. We do not have sufficient amount of 
information to explain why this coefficient is small.  Just like Egypt, 
the production function exhibits decreasing returns to scale, which has 
the same interpretations as before. And, just like Egypt, the education 
of the manager does not seem to matter for output per worker. 
Traditional technology though has a positive effect, but not other 
technologies.  This is most likely reflecting the nature of the products, 
which are most likely traditional.  Again, Alkawaz (2006) report 
reasons for non-performing firms in Morocco similar to those of Egypt, 
where average years of non-performance exceeds 6 years; thus existing 
non-profitable firms. And, one robust and significant factor across 
different methods is ‘balance sheet problems.’    
9UNICEF publishes numbers about child labour in Egypt. We found some information 
on the Internet, which we cannot fully reference. Nevertheless, they give an idea 
about this problem, and they make sense. There are around 11 million children in 
Egypt. There are 2 to 2.5 million children ages 6 to 15 are working. Approximately 
78 percent work in the countryside. Most of them are females. There are 1 to 1.5 
million children are employed in agriculture particularly. Between 12 to 14 percent 
of children in Egypt aged 6-14 are working, part and fulltime. Approximately 21.9 
percent of children aged 10-14 are working. Children under 15 comprise 7 percent 
of total workforce in Egypt. In rural areas, more than 40 percent of children under 
14 are working. In urban areas, 16.5 percent of children under 14 are working. Of 
all working children, 84 percent live in rural areas. Boys make up 29 percent of the 
child labour force; girls make up 71 percent. Approximately 12 percent of Egyptian 
households have working children. About 65 percent of child workers are still 
enrolled in school; 16 percent dropped out and 19 percent never attended. Child 
worker earns, on average, 1/4 -1/3 of an adult wage. And finally, 22 to 30 percent 
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Like Egypt, selling in local markets adversely affects output per 
worker. Selling in regional, national and international markets, on the 
other hand, have significant positive effects on output per worker with 
the coefficient estimates of the international market dummy the 
largest, 1.53.  Razzak (2009) reported that more than 75 percent of 
Morocco’s exports are destined for Europe. 
Moroccan MSEs face fewer more constraints than the Egyptian’s.   
Competition from large and small firms and from micro firms has 
negative effect on output per worker.  This competition is likely to be 
an important determinant of efficiency.     
Adhering to environmental requirements and labour inspections yields 
negative effects as explained earlier.  Child labour is a serious problem 
in Morocco just like it is in Egypt.
10 Labour and environmental 
inspectors probably shutdown firms in case of violation sending 
production to zero.   
Unlike Egypt, financial services; labour cots; labour law; unutilised 
capacity; tax rates; and tax administration have negative effects on 
output per capita with unutilised capacity having the largest 
coefficient.  Alkawaz (2006) also suggested that “unutilised capacity” is 
a factor explaining non-performing firms in many Arab countries 
including Morocco.  
On average, small firms are adversely affected by the quality of labour 
in Morocco. A number of small firms, which produce traditional 
products, cannot find skilled workers. Retaining these skilled workers is 
also a significant constraint that adversely affects productivity. One 
would expect many of the traditional goods and services to suffer when 
the country is modernising.  Technical change in some sectors will 
impose increasing costs on the traditional and unchanging good and 
services sector. MSEs also face high costs.  Thus, traditional goods and 
services which have elastic demand curves will either disappear or 
shrink. When the price goes up people substitute for new, perhaps 
imported, goods and services; and the traditional industries are 
10Lahlou (2008) and the US Department of Labour (2004). Lahlou finds that males 
dominate the list of child labour. In 1994, 65.5 percent of the population under age 
15, are male child workers. Like Egypt they concentrate in rural areas, 88.6 percent 
of all child workers. One hundred percent of children workers between age 7 and 17 
are uneducated. By the end of 1999, the number of children age 7 and 15 who were 
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destroyed eventually. The only hope for MSEs to survive is to increase 
productivity, Baumol (1967). 
Because ‘securing initial capital’ is an important constraint to MSEs, 
and because we could not find it to be significant in the case of 
Morocco, we re-estimated the production function with the three 
dummy variables that represent access to initial capita alone without 
any other dummy.  When we have all three dummy variables (east, 
medium and high) we fail to invert the product matrixXX  .  Only the 
medium dummy is found to be significant, but  significance disappears 
when all other dummy variables are incorporated.   
For Lebanon, The average coefficient of capital expenditures per 
worker is 0.25.  It is slightly smaller than Egypt’s.  The estimated 
<0, so we interpret that the same way we interpreted Egypt and 
Morocco’s production functions.  Just like Egypt and Morocco we 
found no effect from the type of the education level of the manager on 
output per worker.  Further, in Lebanon technology types are 
insignificant.  The interpretation of decreasing returns is also similar to 
our earlier interpretations. 
The market scope also plays a positive effect, especially selling at the 
national level.  The effect of the market scope seems to be an 
important factor in all countries with minor differences. The wider the 
openness is the higher the productivity level.  Selling at local markets 
is always insignificant or negative. 
There are fewer less constraints on the Lebanese output per worker 
than Morocco and Egypt. The main constraints are competition from 
large and small firms.  Large and small firms may have lower costs of 
production than MSEs.  Satisfying environmental requirement again 
comes significant.  This adds costs to MSEs.  Labour cost, licensing, 
tax rate, and unutilised capacity are significantly negatively affecting 
productivity level in Lebanon.  Interestingly, lack of qualified workers 
and retaining qualified workers did not come as a significant constraint 
like they did in the cases of Egypt and Morocco.  Would that mean 
Lebanon has no skill shortages?
11 And, ‘securing initial capital’ is found 
to be insignificant even if we have these dummy variables alone in the 
11There are no studies on the labour market in Lebanon. The US Department of State 
webpage on Lebanon updated January 2009 says that “Lebanon has a high 
proportion of skilled labour compared with many other Arab countries”. We do not 
know of the basis of this statement. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35833.htm. Weshah A. Razzak    79
production function regression.  It is well-documented that Lebanon’s 
financial market is relatively efficient, Creane el al. (2004).  
Turkey’s average coefficient of capital expenditures per worker is 0.18, 
which is slightly smaller than that of Lebanon and half that of Egypt’s.  
Interestingly, the production function exhibits increasing returns to 
scale with the coefficient  0.11   .  This is quite different from the 
other Arab countries.  When the regression is expanded by adding the 
dummy variables, the coefficient becomes negative.  That could mean 
that the removal of constraints to MSEs reduces the costs to 
expanding output per worker.  More interestingly and unlike the Arab 
countries we find that the level of the education of the owner/manager 
to be significant, especially years of education.  Also, new and up-to-
date technologies have positive effects something we did not find in the 
Arab countries.  This might explain why average production per 
worker is relatively higher.  These estimates are also consistent with 
increasing returns. The dummy variables that represent the scope of 
the market are also significant.  
Regarding the constraints to production, inspections; labour cost; 
quality of labour; competition from small and micro firms; business 
support; and taxes affect production negatively.  Taxes seem to have 
the largest negative effect on production with a combined effect of -
0.83 (-0.60 for Easy and -0.23 for Medium).   
We have corrected for heteroscedasticity using the Huber-white and 
the Newey-West methods and also bootstrapped the residuals.   
Regarding the endogeneity problem (single equation bias), we applied 
the Ramsey RESET specification test (omitted variables, incorrect 
function form, and endogeneity of  i k ).  The P value for Turkey is 
about 0.0169 so the null hypothesis that  2 ~( 0 , ) i NI   is rejected 
indicating general misspecification. However, with higher polynomials 
of the fitted values, the P values get bigger and null could not be 
rejected.  The good news is that the test suggests that we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis all of the Arab countries production functions.  The 
residuals are white-noise in all regressions. To remedy the endogeneity 
problem in general we need either an IV or a GMM estimator, which 
are unfortunately untenable given our data.  Journal of Economics and Econometrics  Vol. 53, No. 1.                                               80
For robustness, we also estimated a CES production function. We do 
not report the results, but they are available upon request.
12 Results 
regarding the signs, the magnitudes and the significance levels of the 
dummies do not change.  
4.2 Nonparametric ranking tests for productivity 
Table 3 reports three test statistics , the Wilcoxon Rank Sum test, the 
continuity-corrected Pearson test and the Kolomogrov-Smirnov test.   
We compare pair wise countries.  We reject the hypothesis that 
productivity in Egypt is equal to that of Morocco in favour of the 
alternative that Egypt’s productivity outranks Morocco’s. The 
probability that productivity in Egypt is higher than that in Morocco 
is 0.998. The medians are also unequal.  Egypt’s productivity is also 
unequal to Lebanon, and the probability that Egypt’s productivity is 
greater than that of Lebanon is 0.252.  Lebanon’s productivity exceeds 
Morocco with a probability 0.998. Turkey’s productivity exceeds all 
other Arab countries; the hypothesis of equality is rejected by all tests 
in favour of the alternative that Turkey’s productivity dominates.  
The question is why Turkey’s MSEs are — on average — more 
productive (i.e., higher level of output per worker) than Egypt and 
Lebanon?  We have shown that the production function is increasing 
returns to scale in Turkey while decreasing returns in the Arab 
countries.  And the mean level of productivity is significantly higher in 
Turkey.  But, to answer this question, perhaps, we need to know 
something about labour skills and TFP.  We examine the level of 
TFPs, i.e., the residuals.  We test for stochastic dominance using the 
same three tests above.  Except for the case of Morocco versus Turkey, 
12A CES function like 1/ [( 1 ) ] YK L        requires no assumptions such as perfect 
competition and profit maximisation. Fitting this CES production function to our 
data is difficult especially because the capital — labour ratios don't vary a lot since 
most firms in the sample are of the same size. Taking logs, use Taylor series 
expansion around  0   , and truncate after the second derivative, Kmenta (1967) 
shows an estimable CES in a linear form would be 
2 ln tan ln (1 )ln 0.5 (1 )(ln ln ) Yc o n s t K L K L           . We estimated this linear function 
alone and with the dummies 1 D  and  2 D  in two separate regressions like those 
presented in table 2. We found   to be 0.28 and 0.30 in the first and second 
regressions respectively for Egypt; 0.30 and 0.50 for Lebanon; failed to converge in 
the case of Morocco (recall that the coefficient of capital was very small in the 
Cobb-Douglas case); and finally  is 0.6 and 0.48 in Turkey. The dummies were 
significant, have correct signs and the magnitudes were very similar to those 
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where the null hypothesis that the distributions are equal could be 
rejected in favour of Turkey, the hypothesis of equality of distributions 
could not be rejected.  Thus, TFP levels are probably similar in 
Turkey, Egypt and Lebanon.  If the TFP level is indeed the same in all 
three countries, i.e., if the result is not a statistical artefact stemming 
from the fact the TFP is a residual, then differences in labour skills 
could explain differences in labour productivity, and future research 
must examine this issue.
13 
Table 3 Tests for equality of the distributions of  ln i y  
Wilcoxon  Rank Sum Test Probability 
  Continuity corrected 
Pearson  2
1 	
*  Kolomogrov-Simrnov 
 
P value  
Mrocco Egypt   
Probability  





Mrocco Egypt   
0.00 0.998 0.00 0.00 
P value  
Egypt Lebanon   
Probability  





Egypt Lebanon   
0.00 0.252 0.00 0.00 
P value  
Morocco Lebanon   
Probability  





Lebanon Morocco   
0.00 0.998 0.00 0.00 
P value  
Egypt Turkey   
Probability  





Turkey Egypt   
0.00 0.998 0.00 0.00 
P value  
Morocco Turkey   
Probability  





Turkey Morocco   
0.00 0.992 0.00 0.00 
P value  
Lebanon Turkey   
Probability  





Turkey Lebanon   
0.00 0.997 0.00 0.00 
Notes:  lny is output per worker. In column 1 H0 is that  AB  and the p value is for 
|| 0 prob Z 	 . In column 2 we report  {} {} pB A 	 . *The test is in Hope, A. C. A. (1968).  
We calculate Pearson, Fisher’s exact and one-sided Fisher’s exact p values, but  do not 
report them because the values are identical to the one we reported here. 
As mentioned earlier, the number of workers do not seem to be the 
main explanatory variable for productivity.  The percentage of firms 
with one worker is 34.1 percent in Egypt, 24.1 percent in Morocco, 
47.6 percent in Lebanon and 15.8 percent in Turkey. Liedholm and 
Mead (1999) say that productivity seems to increase with the number 
of employed workers; firms with one worker are less productive than 
firms with 5 or 10.  Our results seem to be only partially consistent 
with that. Turkey MSEs are most productive, but Morocco's MSEs are 
13Results are available upon request. Journal of Economics and Econometrics  Vol. 53, No. 1.                                               82
less productive than Egypt and Lebanon despite the fact that the 
percentage of one-worker firms is relatively smaller. 
For MSE, skills are important.  Perhaps they are more important than 
capital because of the nature of production of these firms, e.g., 
traditional products.  But, we have no information about labour skills; 
the next surveys should provide some information about the 
education/vocational levels of the workers and not only the manager or 
the owner of the MSE. 
5 FINAL REMARKS  
The Cobb-Douglas production seems to produce sensible elasticities. 
However, we found that the production functions of MSEs in all three 
Arab countries exhibit decreasing returns to scale, which suggests 
either (1) that the markets for these products are small, i.e., it requires 
more than doubling inputs to double output, thus the production 
process is costly; or (2) that output is consistently priced below the 
marginal cost. We found some evidence (Alkawaz, 2006), albeit in 
Arabic language, where quite a large number of firms do not report 
profits and have negative value added yet still alive in both Egypt and 
Morocco.  These firms are called non-performing firms and basically 
have been doing so for up to 6 years on average.  All these firms were 
in manufacturing.  Thus, the second interpretation of  0    maybe still 
valid in developing countries and not as bizarre as Basu, S. and J. G. 
Fernald, (1997) have suggested. 
On the other hand, Turkey’s MSE production function exhibits 
increasing returns to scale. This might imply that Turkey can double 
output without doubling the inputs, i.e., less costly than the Arab 
countries, especially if the constraints to production are dealt with.   
Related to the interpretation that output has been consistently priced 
below marginal cost; we found that on average — across firms and 
countries — the level and type of education of the owner /manager is 
irrelevant to output per worker in all three Arab countries.  But, 
education of the owner matters for productivity in Turkey.  Further, 
new and up-to-date technologies are only slightly important for output 
per worker in Egypt, but very important for Turkey.   
Also, education of the owner/manager and the level of technology are 
compliments.  In MSE, the owner could be the one who trains workers 
on the use of traditional or the new technology.  The owner’s human Weshah A. Razzak    83
capital level is an important factor, Klepper (2004).  In Morocco, 
traditional technology is slightly significant and there is no effect for 
the technology type on output in Lebanon.  In traditional businesses, 
owners rely on experience and traditional technology.  Theoretically, 
Technology induces faster growth.  Our data do not allow us to test 
for growth empirically. It would have been useful for the ERF survey 
to provide information about the level of education of the workers as a 
proxy for human capital. 
Also on average, selling in local markets adversely affects output per 
worker; selling in bigger markets positively affects output per capita.  
Egyptian MSEs benefit from selling in regional and national markets 
while Morocco’s benefit the most from selling in international markets.  
Morocco exports to Europe.  Razzak (2009) reports that more than 75 
percent of Morocco’s exports are destined to Europe.  Policy should 
study ways to provide incentives to increase or widen market scope.  
Such studies might include: removal of red-tape and obstacles, exports 
promotions, subsidise participation in national and international trade 
fares and advertisements, provide information about potential markets, 
etc. 
Regarding the constraints to output per worker, we found that 
‘securing initial capital’ (access to credit) to be a significant constraint 
to output per worker in Egypt only.  This market failure, which is 
usually taken as a rationale for government intervention does not seem 
to be the case in the Moroccan, Lebanese and the Turkish regressions.  
The current survey does not have additional information to identify 
the underlying source of such capital market failure.  The banking 
system in Egypt seems functional.  The underlying sources could be 
Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection. MSEs have a relatively higher 
exit rates (low survival probability), which makes access to credit 
difficult even in a fully functional banking system.  Further research 
into this issue is recommended.  Turkey’s most significant constraint 
on MSE is the high tax rates.  Arab MSEs do not seem be affected by 
taxes, most likely because they pay a lump-sum fee instead of taxes.   
There is evidence that labour inspection and adherence to 
environmental requirements are adversely affecting production in 
Egypt, Morocco and Lebanon.  We speculate that the reason is that 
violators are perhaps forced to shutdown.  For example, child labour is 
widespread in MENA countries. Shutting down production in an MSE 
when all workers (i.e., 1 to 9) are child labour causes output to fall Journal of Economics and Econometrics  Vol. 53, No. 1.                                               84
significantly. This is a serious policy challenge in developing countries 
because governments want to achieve two mutually exclusive goals; 
comply with international labour laws and in the same time increase 
productivity. In developed countries such as Japan, New Zealand and 
Italy, for example, where more than 90 percent of firms are considered 
small, child labour is never a challenge for MSE policy.  
Competition from large, small and other micro firms affects output per 
worker adversely.  Competition from imports and larger businesses is 
commonly cited in the literature as a problem for MSEs. Larger firms 
probably have lower costs of production than MSEs. This makes them 
more competitive. Competition is good for efficiency because 
uncompetitive MSEs exit the market and only efficient ones stick and 
survive.  There is evidence in the literature (see the USAID, 2006) that 
survived MSEs seem to be the ones that contribute to economic 
growth and reduction of poverty. However, competition from other 
micro firms cannot be considered as problem in theory and the ERF 
surveyor should drop that question in future surveys.   
Egyptian MSEs average output per worker is highly adversely affected 
by lack of access to business support; securing initial capital (credits); 
finding qualified (skilled or semi-skilled) labour and retaining them. 
These latter two factors also affect Morocco rather significantly.  Many 
of the jobs in MSE, e.g., craftsmanship jobs, traditional food/sweet 
makers, storekeepers…etc, are intergenerational.  As these countries 
modernise and education becomes widespread, traditional businesses 
suffer from the lack of skilled labour and die off.  This is a challenging 
policy issue, Baumol (1967). 
The distribution of log output per worker in Morocco’s MSE is 
outranked (i.e., stochastically dominated) by log output per worker in 
all the other countries.  The average level of productivity of MSEs in 
Morocco is relatively lower than the averages of the other countries. 
Turkey’s MSEs labour productivity (output per worker) dominates all 
three Arab countries. 
We tested whether TFP levels have equal distributions and found no 
significant differences between Turkey, Egypt and Lebanon.  Turkey’s 
TFP dominate that of Morocco only. If indeed TFP is the same in 
Turkey, Egypt and Lebanon then differences in labour skills could 
explain the differences in labour productivity, but we do not have data 
to test this proposition.  Future surveys should provide information Weshah A. Razzak    85
about labour skills (labour quality) levels and future research should 
examine this issue.    
The decision to promote MSE, or not, depends on the contribution of 
MSE to overall GDP growth and productivity, and perhaps to 
employment and poverty reduction.  Biggs (2002) and Beck et. al. 
(2005) found correlation but no causal link between MSE and GDP 
growth per capita.  Instrumental variable regression seems to render 
the coefficient of MSE insignificant in cross-country growth regressions.  
Anos-Casero and Udomsaph (2009) say they have evidence of ‘causal’ 
link between firm’s TFP growth and: infrastructure quality; financial 
development; governance; labour market flexibility; labour quality; and 
market competition.  This paper cannot shed any light on the growth 
issue as we said earlier because the data we use are for one year only.  
However, this might be a good reason for the ERF survey to be 
repeated every 5 years or so.  A piecemeal survey is not useful in 
general.  
The fact that the size of the firm is an endogenous variable (depends 
on many factors such as the level of human capital, skills, business 
environment…etc); its relation to GDP per worker adds to the policy 
challenges.  MSE that survives all odds might turn out to play an 
important role in aggregate economic growth.  Klepper (2004) studied 
historical US data of survived MSEs. He argues that start-up 
conditions determined the firm’s futures. He found that the ‘human 
capital’ of initial managers is key to survival.  We do not have data on 
experience, but the level and type of education of owners (managers) 
turned out to be insignificant.   
Many MSEs exit over time as the creative-destruction forces play out 
in free market economies.  Research-based policy approach suggests 
that it might be advisable that governments in developing countries 
try to anticipate (estimate) the probability of survival of MSEs and 
then adopt policies to ensure higher productivity to survived firms.  A 
blanket policy to promote all kinds of MSEs is not advisable.   
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